NOTE ON NONCOOPERATIVE CONVEX GAMES
HϋKUKANE NlKAIDO AND KAZUO ISODA 1. Introduction. Nash's equilibrium-point theorem for many-person games can be approached by two methods: first, the Kakutani-type fixed-point theorem 1 is very useful for this game problem; second, in case of finite-dimensional multilinear payoffs, J. Nash himself has given an elegant procedure [7] which is directly based on Brouwer's fixedpoint theorem. In a previous paper [10] one of us proved a general minimax theorem in making use of a procedure analogous to that of Nash. The present note is a continuation of this paper, and its main purpose is to offer further improvements of Nash's method so as to treat noncooperative many-person games played over infinite-dimensional convex sets, based on a generalization of von Neumann's symmetrization method 2 of game matrices. The results thus obtained contain further weakening of (especially topological) assumptions of the equilibriumpoint theorem.
Next we shall discuss the equilibrium-point problem of some general noncooperative games by reducing them to suitable convex games. This will clarify the relevance of convex games to general games. REMARK The notion of equilibrium points first appeared in the celebrated work of Augustin Cournot (see [2] ) and was investigated by him by means of differential calculus. But the contemporary concern about it is to see the existence of these points in the global sense by topological methods. The equilibrium-point problem under conditions a)-d) cannot, however, be treated by the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, since the required upper semi-continuity is not always assured in these cases. Thus, the proof in the following section may deserve some general attention. 3« Generalization of von Neumann's symmetrization and proof of the equilibrium-point theorem. To see the existence of equilibrium points for a convex game, we introduce an auxiliary function. To begin with, denote by
two mutually independent variables with the same domain which is again compact and convex. Next put
It is noted that Φ(x, y) is also concave with respect to xeX. The importance of this function is clarified by: 
where K(x lf x 2 ) is the payoff from player 2 to player 1. This implies the functional form of von Neumann's symmetrization procedure 3 . We shall later present an interpretation of this function with regard to player's behavior.
With this setup, we next prove : THEOREM 3. 1. A convex game always has at least one equilibrium point.
Proof. By Lemma 3. 1., we have only to see the existence of a point yeX such that Φ(y, y)^Φ(%, y) for any xeX. Suppose the contrary were valid. Then, to each yeX, there exists some xeX such that xc υ G a .
by (2) . Hence, in view of the compactness of X, we can find a finite REMARK The foregoing proof is essentially a repetition of the argument in [10] the application of this argument to many-person cases is made possible by the use of Φ(x, y). It should be noticed, however, that despite the generality of Theorem 3. 1, it does not contain the result of [10] . The main reason for this fact is : the quasi-concavity (see [10] ) of the original payoff may be lost in constructing Φ(x, y) . So the theorem in [10] needs separate discussion.
4. An interpretation of Φ(x, y). Lemma 3. 1 can be rewritten as follows : An n-person game has an equilibrium point if and only if ( 4 ) min max [Φ(x, y) -Φ(y, y)\ = 0 . yex xex Now (4) may be interpreted in the following way: Suppose there are n persons P u P ZJ •••, P n . We consider the cases where all the persons P>>, * * J Pn except P τ cooperate. Denote the coalition consisting of only Pi by Qi and that consisting of P z , P 3 , , P n by Q 2 . Q τ and Q> play n original games simultaneously, conforming to the following new rules : We denote these n games by where π denotes the corresponding constant sum.
5 Reduction to convex games. In this section we assume E, t is a normed linear space. We further assume regarding the payoffs Ht(x lf x if •••, x n ) the following conditions: As a direct application of Theorems 3.1 and 5.1 we can see the existence of equilibrium points for games of the foregoing type without Kakutani's theorem.
We now proceed to prove some lemmas.
Let R and S be normed linear spaces. We denote by \\x\\ the norm of a point xeR. A continuous function f(x) over R will be called linear if
for x lt x 2 eR, a λ Λ-α 2 =l. We define the norm of / as usual: ||/||= sup IMl Now, let H(Xj y) be a function on X®Y, where Xand Fare compact convex sets in R and S, respectively, and suppose that the family of functions {H(x, y) xeX} is uniformly equi-continuous.
Let further F y be the totality of linear functions / over R such that (I) H/HSΛ and (II) f(x)^H(x,y) for any xeX.
Putting
we obtain an ^-concave function on X®Y. We call K(x, y) the α -concave envelope of H(x, y). We shall show the continuity of this function by proving the following lemmas. Then !£*(#!, ^2 ? *» ^n) is clearly ^-concave, and is continuous by Lemma 5. 3. Thus, we obtain a convex game. Moreover, the set of equilibrium points of this game coincides with that of the-original game, by Lemma 5. 4. 
